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BUCKLEY'S ANALYTICAL FLAWS
Professor Burt Neuborne"
I am delighted to be able to honor David Trager today. David
and I go back a long way. We met as young(er) lawyers in the
early 70s when, between the two of us, we still had one full head
of hair. We had the responsibility in those days of arguing the
constitutionality of the Vietnam War against each other: David, as
a member of the United States Attorney's office for the Eastern
District and I, as the Assistant Legal Director of the ACLU. Those
were days when passions ran so high that, often, opponents could
not even talk to each other without enmity and anger. But David's
professionalism and decency created a bridge that allowed what
began as mutual respect for the lawyers' craft, to grow into a
deeply valued personal friendship. That is why I am so pleased to
appear today at a symposium in his honor. You could not have
chosen a more appropriate way to celebrate what David Trager
stands for.
You can see why Buckley v. Valeo' was decided as it was. The
plaintiffs had two terrific advocates in Ralph Winter and Joel Gora.
Both advocates have made splendid presentations in defense of the
Buckley holding. But I do not recognize the rosy democratic world
that they describe today. Neither Joel nor Ralph are looking at the
same political world that I see when I open my eyes in the
morning.
I see a world where the Buckley rules foster the open sale of
special, privileged access for the rich to public officials. Whether
it is renting the Lincoln Bedroom for campaign contributions,2 or

* John Norton Pomeroy Professor of Law at New York University School
of Law. B.A., Cornell University; J.D., Harvard Law School.
1 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
2 See Glenn F. Bunting & Ralph Frammolino, Up to 900 Donors Stayed
Overnight at White House Campaign: Many Clinton Backers Used Lincoln
Bedroom, Official Says; Numbers Are Called Staggering, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 9,
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donating $250,000 to the Republican Party in order to obtain
privileged meetings with the congressional leadership,3 or buying
your way into coffee with important policy makers,4 access to
public officials is for sale in the post-Buckley world, and not only
in Washington. Throughout the country, lobbyists make contributions to candidates that should really be called investments. Like
any investment, the lobbyist expects a return on his money: a return
calculated in privileged access and a guarantee that his views will
be heard, often to the exclusion of persons who cannot afford to
buy equivalent access.
In any other public setting, it would be inconceivable to set up
a structure that provides overtly privileged access for the rich. For
example, Judge Winter would never tolerate a system where scarce
oral argument time was allocated according to how much a litigant
could pay. Nor would we tolerate selling time on the floor of the
legislature to the highest bidder. But, in any setting where we really
care about fairness, a reality that we would never think of tolerating
is the norm under Buckley.
I see a world in which voter turnout is plummeting, in large
part, because people are disgusted with the fact that elections look
more like auctions than exercises in democracy. For the 1996
Presidential election, only 48.8% of the eligible electorate voted.'

1997, at Al (describing Clinton's fundraising events); David E. Rosenbaum,
Campaign Finance: Developments So Far, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1997, at B9

(discussing fumdraising practices of the Clinton Administration); Michael
Weisskopf& Charles R. Babcock, DonorsPay and Stay at White House; Lincoln
Bedroom a Special Treat, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1996 at Al (listing Clinton's
campaign contributors, their donations, and the benefits received by each).
' Don Van Natta, Jr. & Jane Fritsch, $250, 000 Buys "the Best Access to
Congress," N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1997, at Al (reporting that in January, 1996,

the Republican National Committee offered private receptions with republican
congressional and presidential candidates in exchange for $250,000 donations).
4 Stephen Labaton, A Clinton Social With Bankers Included a Leading
Regulator, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1997, at 1 (discussing White House coffees

where large Democratic donors met with high ranking regulatory officials).
' Bob Minzesheimer, Turnout Takes a Record Downturn: Nonvoters
Outnumber the Voters, USA TODAY, Nov. 7, 1996, at A3 (reporting turnout of
48.8%); Barbara Vobejda, Just UnderHalf of Possible Voters Went to the Polls,
WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1996, at A30 (discussing the recent decline in participation
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Voter turnout is at the lowest ebb in recent history and going down
all the time. Why are American voters voting with their feet and
literally "walking out" on American democracy?6 One important
reason is that most Americans feel left out of the process by which
the government is chosen. They view that process as a giant
auction. They feel like spectators at the auction because the vast
bulk of Americans cannot afford the ticket of admission.' And,
frighteningly, under Buckley, they may be right.
I see a world without new political ideas and almost bereft of
serious political debate. We spent at least $2.7 billion on the 1996
election, and I defy you to show me a single new idea that emerged
from the so-called debate.' No new ideas are put forward. The
only ideas we hear are ideas that can raise enough money to be
heard. No new candidates emerge. No new access is created for
persons and groups who feel left out of the system. We simply
recycle our incumbents at an astonishing rate. Even in an election
year of great change, over 90% of incumbents get re-elected.
Historically, the incumbent re-election rate hovers in the mid to
upper nineties.'
In 1988, I debated the Soviet Deputy Minister of Justice. He
made a terrifying point. He pointed out that over the past twentyfive years, the turnover rate in the Politburo had been higher than
in elections).
6 See Kevin

K. Green, Note, A Vote ProperlyCast? The Constitutionalityof

the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 22 J. LEGIs. 45, 45-46 (1996)
(discussing the decline in voting).
7 David Cay Johnston, Voting, America's Not Keen On. Coffee is Another
Matter,N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 10, 1996, § 4, at 2 (explaining that many Americans

do not vote because they believe that large contributions determine the election).
8 Ruth Marcus & Charles R. Babcock, The System Cracks Under the Weight
of Cash; Candidates, Parties and Outside Interests Dropped a Record $2.7
Billion, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1997, at Al (reporting that the 1996 Presidential
election was "the costliest ever," as total spending approximated $2.7 billion).
9 See Center for Voting and Democracy, Monopoly Politics: General
Elections, US. House of Representatives, 1954-1996 (visited Sept. 22, 1997)
<http://www.igc.apc.org/cvd/monopoly/genelect.html> (on file with Journalof

Law and Policy) (listing incumbent re-election rates to House of Representatives
from 1954-1996, ranging from a high of 98.8% in 1968 to a low of 88.4% in
1964, with a 94.5% incumbent re-election rate in 1996).
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the turnover rate in the House of Representatives. What kind of
democracy was that, he jeered?
I answered that if we were allowed to create vacancies in
Congress the same way that Stalin created vacancies in the
Politburo, we would have lots of openings to fill as well. But he
had a point. Our system is rigged to favor the status quo. Judge
Winter admitted as much when he argued that the status quo often
overpowers challengers.' ° Under Buckley, incumbents raise far
more money than challengers, precisely because incumbents can
sell privileged access to government power throughout their terms.
It is unpersuasive, to put it mildly, to argue that Buckley aids
change by permitting an occasional challenger to out-spend an
incumbent, when the reality is that the vast bulk of incumbents outraise and out-spend challengers-and always will."
The only way to instigate real change in our political system is
to change the way it is financed. I believe that Judge Winter's
economics lesson is simply wrong. He argues, based on analogies
with certain types of product advertising, that unregulated campaign
spending actually benefits challengers because the marginal return
on spending for unknown, or little known products is greater than
for well-known products.' 2 Thus, he argues, since each additional
dollar spent advertising a new French restaurant is more valuable
than the same dollar advertising the established one, challengers are
benefitted by unlimited campaign spending. " But he ignores one
thing. Incumbents generally have access to greater resources than
any challenger. Incumbents always win, in part, because allowing
a challenger to raise and spend enough to gain visibility almost
never allows the challenger to raise enough to win, as long as the
incumbent can raise and spend more. The only way challengers will

"0See Ralph K. Winter, The History and Theory of Buckley v. Valeo, 6 J.L.
& POL'Y 93 (1997).
" See Center for Voting and Democracy, Monopoly Politics: Open Seats and
Money, 1996 US. HouseElections (visited Sept. 22, 1997) <http://www.igc.apc.-

org/cvd/monopoly/open2.html> (on file with Journal of Law and Policy)
(chronicling relative spending of incumbents and challengers in 1996 Congressional elections).
12

See Winter, supra note 10, at 104-05.
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See Winter, supra note 10, at 105.
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ever have a fair chance to win in large numbers is if campaign
financing is reformed to assure both sides relatively equal access to
campaign resources.
I believe that Buckley and the rules it fostered are responsible
for much of what is wrong with our current political structure. If
Buckley were analytically sound, my concerns would be directed at
a constitutional amendment, not at the Court's opinion. But Buckley
is not analytically sound. It suffers from three major analytical
flaws. First, at the core of Buckley is the assumption that a one-toone correlation exists between spending money and protected
political speech. The Court reasoned that since money fuels speech,
any effort to control the spending of money necessarily inhibits
speech. Thus, reasoned the Court, the identical First Amendment
standards govern both efforts to censor political speech and efforts
to regulate political spending. 4
When relatively modest sums are involved, there is a good deal
of wisdom in the Court's linkage of money and speech. But, even
if one agrees that a close correlation exists between speech and the
first dollar spent to fund it, or even the thousandth, or ten thousandth dollar, it does not follow that the one-to-one correlation
between money and speech holds at the millionth, or ten millionth,
or billionth dollar levels. The one-to-one correlation argument
suffers from the fallacy of fungibility. Just because Buckley was
decided correctly, because the spending ceilings were far too low,
it does not follow that even extremely generous spending caps are
invalid.
So, the first thing about Buckley that I hope people will re-think
is the Court's insistence that regulating money should always be
treated identically with censoring political speech, even at high
levels of expenditure.
Buckley's second analytical flaw is the Court's attempt to draw
a bright-line distinction between expenditures and contributions. 5
The distinction is logically untenable and pragmatically disastrous.
It is logically untenable because the Court's insistence that a
contribution is less of a First Amendment act than an expenditure

'4
IS

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15, 23 (1976).
Id. at 20-21, 23.
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defies reality. When I contribute money to a candidate, I engage in
an act of political association that is just as important as my
decision to spend money on the candidate's behalf independently.
It is simply wrong to treat the two as fundamentally different acts.
Moreover, the Court's contention that expenditures do not risk
16
corruption, but contributions pose such a risk, is not persuasive.
If I contribute $1,001 to a single candidate, the Supreme Court
perceives a risk of corruption. If my wife spends $10 million on
behalf of the same candidate, and creates a huge upsurge of support
for him, the Court apparently believes that while there might be a
quid pro quo for my $1,001, there is no chance of undue influence
deriving from my wife's $10 million. Somehow, the Court believes
that no risk of undue influence flows from the $10 million
expenditure because the candidate and the supporter do not meet
until after the money is spent. But everything we know about the
political world tells us that politicians know who supports them,
and if a supporter spends enough money, the candidate will bend
over backwards to please him after the election.
The bright line between expenditures and contributions is, I
believe, doomed. It cannot be abandoned too soon. The distinction
has led to the worst of all possible worlds, in which demand for
campaign money cannot be limited, but supply has been severely
constrained. I agree completely with Judge Winter that no rational
legislature would ever have enacted the regulatory scheme that
emerged from Buckley. Go ask your neighborhood economist what
happens when demand is uncontrollable, but supply is significantly
restricted. You get a Black Market. That is exactly what has
happened to our political system. Candidates are desperate for
money and will do virtually anything to get it. If we close one
loophole, another opens because, unless demand can be limited,
you can never stop politicians from trying to get their money fix.
That is what happened in 1996 with "soft money." 7 Two
hundred fifty million dollars, most of it from corporations, poured
through a loophole that allowed virtually uncontrolled contributions

16

Id. at 33.

'7See Anthony Corrado, Giving, Spending and "Soft Money," 6 J.L. &
POL'Y 45 (1997) (discussing the concept and development of "soft money").
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to political parties. 8 Under Buckley, candidates are like superpowers, locked in an ever escalating arms race, but unable to put
an end to the spiral because Buckley makes it impossible to cap
campaign spending. Candidates must continue to raise funds, not
necessarily because they wish to do so, but because they are afraid
that their opponents will out-raise them. The current rules not only
trap candidates in an often involuntary upward spending spiral, but
they place enormous pressure on candidates to cut comers because
the money is so desperately needed.
Buckley's third analytical flaw is its refusal to acknowledge that
fostering equal political participation is a sufficiently compelling
interest to justify some regulation of campaign spending. Time does
not permit a full discussion of the many ways the unequal playing
field mandated by Buckley corrodes democratic ideals. Suffice it to
say that I believe that much of the cynicism that plagues American
democracy flows from our collective knowledge that the financing
rules are simply not fair. We know that the rich are more equal
than the rest of us, and it saps our democratic faith.
The result is that Buckley is like a rotten tree. Give it a good,
hard push and, like a rotten tree, Buckley will keel over. The only
question is in which direction. Once the Court says that contributions and expenditures are to be in treated the same manner, the
Court may say that both can be regulated, or neither. Frankly, any
change would be welcome. I would rather see an entirely unregulated system than a system where we regulate supply, but can do
nothing about demand.
Ideally, I hope that the Court will repudiate Buckley and hold
that both expenditures and contributions may be subject to
reasonable regulation. I agree with Judge Winter that if regulation
is permitted, Congress may try to starve the election process by
setting the limits too low, since unreasonably low limits will tend
to help incumbents. 9 I agree that Congress must be told that if
regulation is to be permitted, it must not result in an inadequately

's

See, e.g, David E. Rosenbaum, In PoliticalMoney Game, The Year of the

Big Loopholes, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 26, 1996, at Al (discussing gaps in campaign
financing laws, including soft money).
"9See Winter, supra note 10, at 103.
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funded election process. But merely because the electoral process
should be well nourished does not mean that we must endure an
entirely unregulated regime of campaign spending.
Finally, I am going to ask you to participate in a thought
experiment in order to illustrate the potential for reform. Go back
in time 100 years, and imagine what democracy looked like. We
used the viva voce vote, which permitted any eligible voter to cast
a vote for any candidate by merely showing up at the polls and
demanding to vote, often in public.2° No registration. No official
ballot.
The viva voce process was chaotic and often corrupt. But it was
also fluid, unbelievably open, and virtually free from any governmental control. A voter would show up at the polls on election day.
Party representatives would press their version of a "correct" ballot
on the voter, who would take one ballot and place it in the ballot
box, generally in full view of the party representatives. The process
was subject to corruption--stuffing the ballot box with additional
party ballots was a constant risk. Pressures associated with public
voting were also a serious problem.
In response to the problems associated with the viva voce ballot,
we adopted the Australian ballot, which placed real limits on voting
and the process of running for office.2" We adopted an official,
government-defined, ballot. We imposed rules on whose name
could appear on the official ballot. We required ballot secrecy. We
imposed voter registration, thereby creating an official, governmentdefined, electorate. Many states restricted absentee ballots and some
states would not even allow write-in voting.22
See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 200 (1992) (discussing the use of
the viva voce method of elections).
21 See id. at 202 (discussing the American adoption of the Australian ballot,
which included the adoption of an official ballot as well as the erection of
polling booths). See generally L.E. FREDMAN, THE AUSTRALAN BALLOT: THE
20

AMERICAN REFORM (1968) (providing a history of the Australian
ballot and its adoption in the United States).
22 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441-42 (1992) (upholding Hawaii's
absolute ban on write-in ballots). See David L. Permut & Joseph P. Verdon,
STORY OF AN

Note, Protecting the American Tradition of Write-In Voting After Burdick v.
Takushi, 9 J.L. & POL. 185, 186-87 (1992) (noting those states that completely

prohibit write-in voting and those that restrict write-in voting in some manner).
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When the Australian ballot reforms were adopted, there were
howls of protest arguing that a secret ballot confined to officially
designated candidates was undemocratic. The protests over the
adoption of the Australian ballot in the 19th century sounded a lot
like Judge Winter: "We can't agree to a governmentally-defined
and sanctioned secret ballot because it would mean too much
government regulation of what should be a fluid and open First
Amendment process."23
Today, most of us do not even notice the restrictions because
we are so inured to them. But the adoption of the Australian ballot
had a real cost. It is much harder for a third party or an independent to run for office today than it was before the reforms. The
process is much more cumbersome. Indeed, in my opinion, it is far
too cumbersome.' The refusal of a few states to permit write-in
voting is particularly indefensible. But, would anyone want to go
back to the days of the viva voce vote? I think not. We are
psychologically comfortable with the Australian ballot reforms
because we are used to them, and because, on balance, we believe
that democracy works better with them than without them. Indeed,
virtually all states ban classic political speech within a fixed
2 FREDMAN, supra note 23, at 14-15 (describing debates over adoption of
Australian ballot system, including the opposition of John Stuart Mill).
4 The first Supreme Court case to provide constitutional protection to the

right to run for office was Williams v. Rhodes. See 393 U.S. 23 (1968)
(invalidating Ohio ballot access rules for third parties). Subsequent cases provide
some protection for the right to run for office, but have upheld numerous ballot
access and voter disqualification rules. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area
New Party, 117 S.Ct. 1364 (1997) (upholding anti-fusion law which precludes
one party from placing a candidate on a ballot if that candidatehas alreadybeen
nominated by another party); Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982)
(upholding limits on running for office); American Party of Texas v. White, 415
U.S. 767 (1974) (upholding Texas ballot access laws preventing current

officeholders from running for seats in the state legislature); Storer v. Brown,
415 U.S. 724 (1974) (upholding California ballot access laws and remand
signature requirement for additional fact-finding); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S.

431 (1971) (upholding 5% signature requirement for ballot access). The most
promising effort to provide constitutional protection for the right to run for office
was in Anderson v. Celebrezze, where Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
urged the use of First Amendment analysis to test restrictions on participation in
the democratic process. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
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distance from the polls, even though it is a content-based restriction
on our most protected form of speech. The Supreme Court recently
upheld the ban, which was part of the Australian ballot reforms,
because it advances a compelling interest in fair elections.25
There is, I believe, no principled difference between the 19th
century "Australian ballot" decision to impose significant regulation
on the nomination and voting process, and a late 20th century
decision to impose reasonable regulations on the entire campaign
process. In each case, there are costs to democracy. But, in each
case, the benefits appear to outweigh the costs. As a matter of pure
analysis, therefore, Supreme Court recognition in Burson v.
Freeman26 that political speech can be banned from the polling
areas because of a compelling interest in fair elections sets the
model for reasonable regulation of the campaign itself-as long as
the requisite showing of a compelling need and narrow tailoring is
made.
The rules governing this symposium provide a model for the
showing of a compelling need. The participants have accepted
significant restrictions on their free speech rights. We have agreed
to talk about particular topics. We have accepted time limits. We
have agreed, tacitly, not to disrupt each other. Similarly, when I
argue in court, I accept significant limits on what I can say, and
how long I have to say it, in order to make the process work better.
My classroom is also constrained by a host of structural restrictions
on uncontrolled expression. In short, we routinely accept what I
will call "structural limitations" on totally free speech in order to
assure that a given speech-setting operates most effectively. Who
would hold a meeting without some version of "Robert's Rules of
Order?"
When we are planning the process that will culminate in the
selection of a great deliberative assembly of the people, why is it
not possible to impose structural rules on ourselves to assure that
one person does not drown everyone else out and that everyone
gets a fair chance to have his or her say? The Buckley rules forbid
2' Burson,
26

504 U.S. at 195 (upholding 100 foot exclusion zone).
Id. at 206 (identifying the prevention of voter intimidation and election

fraud as compelling state interests).
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us to try. But an unregulated process allows only a small slice of
the population-the three percent with enough money to make
large contributions-to dominate the discussion, with much of the
population playing the role of passive observer. In my opinion, that
kind of democracy is not worthy of the Madisonian ideal. I simply
do not believe that it violates Madison's First Amendment to search
for a system of structural rules that will enable a more reasoned, a
more open, and a more equal discussion leading up to the crucial
vote.
In closing, my wife Helen has a pet aphorism, usually directed
at me, that I am afraid is applicable to the hard-liners who say
"absolutely no reform of the campaign finance system. It would be
the end of the First Amendment." Helen says that the definition of
a fanatic is a person who re-doubles his efforts when he loses sight
of his goals. I believe that Madison's goal in inventing the First
Amendment was the creation of a democratic polity that is equally
open to all, not merely to the rich, or to organized special interests.
My sense is that some reform of the campaign finance process is
needed to make Madison's goal a reality. It seems perverse,
therefore, to argue for a re-doubling of First Amendment efforts
that would frustrate the very goals that underlie the First Amendment itself.

